Scoring rules and abnormally low bids criteria in construction tenders: a taxonomic review by Ballesteros-Pérez, Pablo et al.
Scoring rules and abnormally low bids 
criteria in construction tenders: a 
taxonomic review 
Article 
Published Version 
Creative Commons: Attribution 4.0 (CC­BY) 
Open Access 
Ballesteros­Pérez, P., Skitmore, M., Pellicer, E. and González­
Cruz, M. C. (2015) Scoring rules and abnormally low bids 
criteria in construction tenders: a taxonomic review. 
Construction Management and Economics, 33 (4). pp. 259­
278. ISSN 0144­6193 doi: 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01446193.2015.1059951 Available at 
http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/51064/ 
It is advisable to refer to the publisher’s version if you intend to cite from the 
work. 
To link to this article DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01446193.2015.1059951 
Publisher: Taylor & Francis 
All outputs in CentAUR are protected by Intellectual Property Rights law, 
including copyright law. Copyright and IPR is retained by the creators or other 
copyright holders. Terms and conditions for use of this material are defined in 
the End User Agreement . 
www.reading.ac.uk/centaur 
CentAUR 
Central Archive at the University of Reading 
Reading’s research outputs online
Scoring rules and abnormally low bids criteria in construction
tenders: a taxonomic review
PABLO BALLESTEROS-PE´REZ1* , MARTIN SKITMORE2 , EUGENIO PELLICER3 and
M. CARMEN GONZA´LEZ-CRUZ4
1Dpto. de Ingenierı´a y Gestio´n de la Construccio´n, Facultad de Ingenierı´a, Universidad de Talca, Camino los Niches, km 1, Curico´, Chile
2School of Civil Engineering and the Built Environment, Queensland University of Technology, Gardens Point, Brisbane Q4001,
Australia
3School of Civil Engineering, Universitat Polite`cnica de Vale`ncia, Camino de Vera s/n, 46022 Valencia, Spain
4Departamento de Proyectos de Ingenierı´a, Escuela Te´cnica Superior de Ingenieros Industriales, Universitat Polite`cnica de Vale`ncia,
Camino de Vera s/n, 46022 Valencia, Spain
Received 20 October 2014; accepted 4 June 2015
In the global construction context, the best value or most economically advantageous tender is becoming a
widespread approach for contractor selection, as an alternative to other traditional awarding criteria such as
the lowest price. In these multi-attribute tenders, the owner or auctioneer solicits proposals containing both a
price bid and additional technical features. Once the proposals are received, each bidder’s price bid is given
an economic score according to a scoring rule, generally called an economic scoring formula (ESF) and a techni-
cal score according to pre-specified criteria. Eventually, the contract is awarded to the bidder with the highest
weighted overall score (economic + technical). However, economic scoring formula selection by auctioneers is
invariably and paradoxically a highly intuitive process in practice, involving few theoretical or empirical
considerations, despite having been considered traditionally and mistakenly as objective, due to its mathematical
nature. This paper provides a taxonomic classification of a wide variety of ESFs and abnormally low bids criteria
(ALBC) gathered in several countries with different tendering approaches. Practical implications concern the
optimal design of price scoring rules in construction contract tenders, as well as future analyses of the effects
of the ESF and ALBC on competitive bidding behaviour.
Keywords: Bidding; competitiveness; international comparison; scoring rule; tendering
Introduction
Competitive tendering1 is the conventional method for
procuring major construction projects such as building,
infrastructure and shipbuilding. The need to guarantee
transparency, publicity and equal opportunity in public
procurement demands clear procedures to be followed
by bidders (de Boer et al., 2001; Falagario et al., 2012)
in order to reduce the risk of unfair bias or corruption
(Celentani and Ganuza, 2002; Auriol, 2006).
The simplest, most transparent and effective means
of doing this is by what is usually termed the traditional
method, in which the contract is awarded to the lowest
bidder (Waara and Bro¨chner, 2006; Wang et al., 2006).
This method provides the best motivation for project
cost reduction (Bajari and Tadelis, 2001) and predomi-
nates in both public and private sectors in the United
States (Art Chaovalitwongse et al., 2012), Europe
(Rocha de Gouveia, 2002; Bergman and Lundberg,
2013) and many other countries worldwide.
Despite its widespread use, however, the traditional
lowest bid method is considered by many to be a recipe
for trouble (Holt et al., 1994a; Williams, 2003), espe-
cially in an oversupplied market (Hatush and Skitmore,
1998; Oviedo-Haito et al., 2014). Factors such as
shortage of contracts, difficulties in prescribing and
measuring the quality of work, uncertainty of future
costs and potential for claims, encourage a situation
where the lowest bid is often not the best bid in terms
of price (Hatush and Skitmore, 1998; Wong et al.,
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2001), time (Shr and Chen, 2003; Lambropoulos,
2007) and quality (Molenaar and Johnson, 2003; Asker
and Cantillon, 2008).
In contrast with the construction industry’s devotion
to the traditional method (Palaneeswaran and Kumar-
aswamy, 2000; Wang et al., 2006), selection of the best
price-quality bidder has been promoted for a long time,
with early work dating back to 1968 (Simmonds,
1968). This involves also taking non-price or technical/
quality factors into consideration in obtaining an opti-
mum outcome for the contracting authority, the owner
or the auctioneer (Wang et al., 2013), i.e. the best value
for money (Holt et al., 1995). For this, the auctioneer
seeks to maximize the owner’s value for a certain budget
(price). Generally, this change of paradigm is named
best value (BV) in the US (Molenaar and Johnson,
2003) and the most economically advantageous tender
(MEAT or EMAT) in the EU and other parts of the
world (Bergman and Lundberg, 2013).
In short, the implementation of this awarding
approach requires the technical/quality and economic
proposals of bidders to be scored and weighed to allow
the auctioneer to rank them and identify the most eco-
nomically advantageous tender. The problem lies in
knowing how the economic scoring affects the bidders’
aggressive/conservative behaviour (Ballesteros-Pe´rez,
Gonza´lez-Cruz, Pastor-Ferrando et al., 2012), the bias
or unfairness of bidder ranking, or how it even facili-
tates collusion among competitors (Dini et al., 2006).
However, no attempts have been made to date to pro-
pose a unified classification of the current economic
scoring rules (named here as an economic scoring for-
mula, or ESF) that affect the bid price, to differentiate
them from the technical/quality bid factors that are also
scored and weighed in order to award a contract (not
addressed in this study).
A clear ESF classification or taxonomy is generally a
first-order requirement to homogenize ongoing
research and allow future developments in almost any
discipline, but most likely the countries’ different para-
digms concerning bidding and awarding criteria and
the traditional common belief considering these rules
as ‘given’ and ‘immutable’ might have had a strong
influence in keeping such a unified ESF taxonomy from
being effectively developed (Ballesteros-Pe´rez and
Skitmore, 2014). Therefore, a taxonomic review is pre-
sented of the mathematical expressions for the ESF
used in many countries to convert the economic
component (bid price) of proposals into scores. In
order to do this, a comprehensive review of several
countries’ bidding practices is analysed and their
common features summarized into a single parametric
model that includes both the ESFs themselves along
with the abnormally low bids criteria (ALBC)
responsible for setting a price threshold for identifying
unrealistically low bids. The findings of this research
will contribute to improved ESF and ALBC selection
by auctioneers in the future and to expand new
research, raising awareness about aspects that still need
to be treated in scoring rule bidding.
In order to achieve this goal, the paper is organized
as follows. The next section provides a literature review
structured into two subsections. The first subsection
introduces the weighted scoring method, while the sec-
ond deals with the different components that comprise
the scoring rules. In the following section, two impor-
tant tender aspects are highlighted: the difference
between the ranking and scoring rules, and the differ-
ence between capped and uncapped tenders. Later, a
conceptual framework is proposed in the form of a
taxonomic classification, taking into consideration the
scoring parameters actually implemented by the ESF;
ALBC are also analysed at this point. Finally, a discus-
sion of the results is then included, where an effect dee-
ply related to the ESF mathematical configuration,
named apparent or phony economic bid weighting, is also
highlighted and studied.
Literature review
Weighted scoring method
Under different denominations, most public interna-
tional procurement laws and guidelines (e.g. European
Union, 2004;UnitedNations, 2006, 2011;World Bank,
2011; EuropeAID, 2014) provide two main contract
awarding approaches, namely: a price-only (lowest
price) criterion or weighted multiple criteria (MEAT
or BV) (Dini et al., 2006). Generally, the lowest price
is recommended for procurement, where the technical
specifications or statement of works, as well as bill of
quantities, are clear (Dini et al., 2006). On the other
hand, a weighted multiple criteria approach is used for
more complex procurement where the evaluation
requires a number of criteria other than price to be con-
sidered and balanced in order to ensure best value for
money and where there are different types of scales to
be used for the various elements of the offer (Dini
et al., 2006). For this reason, these auctions or tenders
are often called multi-attribute or multidimensional.
The need for weighting and scoring economic crite-
ria or price-related factors (e.g. life cycle costs, cost of
maintenance, decommission costs) along with technical
criteria (e.g. compliance, time, availability, quality) is
because they are part of a mathematical expression that
determines (theoretically) the best return on invest-
ment of the procurement of goods, works or services
for the owner (Asker and Cantillon, 2010). Whenever
a weighted scoring method is implemented, the owner,
contracting authority or auctioneer must specify
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beforehand in the tender specifications both the criteria
and the weights with which the bidders’ proposals will
be evaluated. As a general rule, weighted scoring
methods can be expressed as:
Oi ¼ We " Si þWt " Tif g di (1)
where:
Oi is the overall score achieved by bidder i (with
i ¼ 1; 2; :::;N bidders) in a tender.
We is the weight of the economic criteria for tenders
for similar projects. In general,We is pre-set by the auc-
tioneer within 0 ≤We ≤ 1. When We = 1, the tender is
awarded to the lowest price bidder.
Si is bidder i’s economic score that is calculated
according to bidder i’s submitted economic bid and
by means of the ESF pre-set by the auctioneer. For
the sake of simplicity, it is assumed here that
0 ≤ Si ≤ 1, but this variable is also usually expressed
by a score, for example 0 ≤ Si ≤ 100 points.
Wt is the weight of the technical criteria. In general,
Wt is also pre-set by the auctioneer and, since whenever
there are no special tender requirementsWt = 1 –We, it
is also the case that 0 ≤Wt ≤ 1. Analogously, when
Wt = 1 the tender is awarded exclusively according to
the technical criteria; these tenders are sometimes
called beauty contests (Bergman and Lundberg, 2013).
Ti is bidder i’s technical score that is calculated
according to a set of rules, scales or rates for the differ-
ent attributes that interest the owner or auctioneer.
Again, it is assumed that 0 ≤ Ti ≤ 1, but this variable
can also be expressed as the sum of several technical
and/or quality aspects that are also usually scored in
points.
δi is an abnormality index that equals 1 when bidder
i’s bid is above (more expensive) than the threshold
defined by the ALBC, allowing the bidder to compete,
and which equals 0 if this condition is not fulfilled.
Whenever δi = 0, bidder i’s bid is cheaper than the
ALBC or, in other words, unrealistically low and,
therefore, disqualified. δi is calculated according to
another mathematical expression, named the ALBC,
which is generally independent of the ESF.
Components of the scoring rules
Having defined mathematically the weighted scoring
methods, there are four aspects that can be analysed:
(a) the way the economic score is calculated (variable
Si, i.e., the ESF); (b) the way the technical score is
calculated (variable Ti); (c) the way the weights are
set (relative importance of variables We and Wt to each
other or even the sub-weights within each economic
and technical proposal); and, finally, (d) how the
ALBC are defined (variable δi). This study will focus
later only on the ESF and ALBC (variables Si and δi).
To date, many researchers have dealt with defining
the technical factors, Ti, to be taken into consideration
in BV/MEAT selection (e.g. Holt et al., 1994a, 1994b;
Palaneeswaran and Kumaraswamy, 2000; Shen et al.,
2004; Waara and Bro¨chner, 2006).
With regard to the economic and technical weight
values (variables We and Wt), the most common
approach is the linear weighting method (European
Union, 2004), where the auctioneer assigns a weight
to each criterion in advance. Considered in this way,
the issue then becomes one of solving a multi-criteria
decision-making problem concerning the weights of
several factors (Holt et al., 1994c; Hatush and Skitmore,
1998; Pongpeng and Liston, 2003; Wang et al., 2013).
Furthermore, Jennings and Holt (1998) define multi-
criteria decision-making as a ‘selection based on evalua-
tion of tender submissions against criteria predeter-
mined by auctioneers and considered important by
them in terms of achieving successful project comple-
tion’. Additional techniques have been applied by other
researchers, including multi-attribute analysis (Holt
et al., 1994b, 1994c), the analytic hierarchy process
(Pastor-Ferrando et al., 2010; Wang et al., 2013), fuzzy
sets (Nieto-Morote and Ruz-Vila, 2012), case-based
reasoning models (Dikmen et al., 2007), neural net-
works (Art Chaovalitwongse et al., 2012), and data
envelopment analysis (Falagario et al., 2012).
However, despite the extensive scientific literature
focused on ensuring the best balance of economic and
technical weights, the weights to be disclosed in
requests for proposals are still currently based on sub-
jective judgments (Lorentziadis, 2010). Fixed criterion
weights ensure objectivity and reduce the risk of unfair-
ness and corruption in the evaluation of bidders’ pro-
posals, but only provided they accurately reflect the
relative importance of the evaluation factors to the
owner. However, it is still possible to create an unfair
evaluation system in which too much emphasis is
placed on particular evaluation factors, thus favouring
(intentionally or unintentionally) those bidders that
score highly in the corresponding factors (Lorentziadis,
2010). When weights are subjectively set and fixed
before the bid process, the evaluation system is said to
correspond to a pre-subjective input model (Pongpeng
and Liston, 2003).
Two multi-attribute auction variables remain to be
addressed: the economic scoring formula (ESF, vari-
able Si) and the abnormally low bids criteria (ALBC,
variable δi) which are the main concern of this paper
for, as will be seen later, they can also significantly
influence previous variables (Ti, We and Wt).
The ESF, as already mentioned, is used to trans-
late the bid prices proposed by the bidders into eco-
nomic scores (Ballesteros-Pe´rez, Gonza´lez-Cruz, and
Can˜avate-Grimal, 2012). Auctioneers tend to use
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similar or identical ESFs for all their projects but
different auctioneers use different ESFs. ESFs also
differ between countries. Waara and Bro¨chner
(2006) and Fuentes-Bargues et al. (2014), for exam-
ple, report a variety of different ESFs used by
Swedish municipalities and Spanish public agencies.
Nevertheless, in the highly competitive world of con-
struction bidding, the ESF chosen is likely to have sig-
nificant consequences on the outcome of the auction
in terms of aggressiveness (very low bids to win the
auction) or conservativeness (higher bids to avoid
being disqualified as being unrealistic) of bidders
and the outcome of the project (Palaneeswaran and
Kumaraswamy, 2001).
However, very little is known of the relationship
between ESFs and other multiple aspects of bidding
behaviour. Consequently, ESF selection by auctioneers
in practice is invariably a highly intuitive and subjective
process (Holt et al., 1994b, 1994c), involving few theo-
retical or empirical considerations. This produces scor-
ing rules in practice that are often poorly designed
(Bergman and Lundberg, 2013) and affected by inter-
nal consistency and validity problems (Borcherding
et al., 1991); this situation is unfortunately shared with
other tender documents and leads to cost estimate
inaccuracy, claims and disputes (Laryea, 2011).
Therefore, despite the extensive research on com-
petitive bidding over the years (Holt, 2010; Oo et al.,
2010), ESF selection is a relatively unresearched area.
With very few exceptions, such as Asker and Cantillon
(2008, 2010), there is a paucity of research that bridges
the gap between the theoretical analyses of abstract
scoring rules and their practical application in procure-
ment practice (Bergman and Lundberg, 2013).
Likewise, unrealistically low bids have also received
very little attention in the literature to date (Chao and
Liou, 2007; Ballesteros-Pe´rez et al., 2013b). However,
when we refer to abnormally low bids criteria (ALBC),
we are not focusing on analysing the reason or even the
features of bids considered too low to be acceptable.
Instead, we refer to how the auctioneer defines mathe-
matically, before receiving the bids, the value below
which every bidder will be objectively disqualified when
submitting a cheaper bid (Ballesteros-Pe´rez, Gonza´lez-
Cruz, Pastor-Ferrando et al., 2012). For example, some
countries define abnormally low bids by the arithmetic
deviation from the average bid (International Chamber
of Commerce, 2000), even though there is no assur-
ance that such methods accurately identify an actually
unrealistically low bid (European Union, 2002;
Chotibhongs and Arditi, 2012).
On the other hand, many attempts have been made
to propose objective statistical methods to determine
the threshold below (or above) which a bid is consid-
ered to be abnormal. The problem is that all these
methods are useful ex post (after the tender deadline,
and therefore not included in the tender specifications).
Since everyone acknowledges that statistical methods
are open to error and distortion, no successful (objec-
tive and indisputable) solution has been found so far
(European Union, 2002).
Therefore, the definition of ALBC here only
attempts to draw a line that will disqualify low bids; it
does not intend to deal with auction rules to discourage
collusion, as discussed in depth in the scientific litera-
ture (Che and Kim, 2006, 2009; Chowdhury, 2008).
ALBC are not always present, but the narrower they
are, the more conservative the bids become in order to
avoid being disqualified (Ballesteros-Pe´rez, Gonza´lez-
Cruz, and Can˜avate-Grimal, 2012; Ballesteros-Pe´rez
et al., 2013a). According to the specifications and pro-
curement guidelines studied, the largest difference
between countries lies in ALBC values used.
Therefore, in addressing the problem of ESF and
ALBC selection, a conceptual framework in the form
of a taxonomic classification for both variables in con-
struction auctions is first proposed, followed by some
insights into its use. It is anticipated, therefore, that
the findings of this research will contribute to improved
ESF and ALBC selection by auctioneers in the future
and to expand new research, raising awareness of the
aspects still in need of treatment in the bidding scoring
rule domain.
Economic scoring formula (ESF) taxonomy
In order to create an ESF taxonomy, several notation
and methodological aspects need to be addressed to
homogenize current knowledge of these scoring rules.
First, a clear difference between a ranking and a
scoring rule needs to be established. Ranking rules
are used whenever the only awarding criterion is
the price, whereas scoring rules are required in
multi-attribute tenders to be able to combine their
technical and economic components. Mathematical
expressions are necessary for the latter kind of rules
when it comes to converting the bid values into
scores, which is the reason the approach taken is
eminently mathematical.
Second, the difference between capped and
uncapped tenders needs to be recognized. This involves
the setting (capped) or not (uncapped) of a maximum
price for bids. It is important to distinguish between
these two common bidding approaches as bidders
behave differently in each of them, mainly because
the ESFs and ALBC are also mathematically different.
Third, a brief explanation is given just before the
ESF taxonomy proposal about the international tender
sources that allowed the study and review of a varied
262 Ballesteros-Pe´rez et al.
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array of tender specifications, as well as national and
international public procurement economic scoring
methods. This aims to show that both the ESF and
ALBC taxonomies are not arbitrary, but based on
real-life and representative samples.
Fourth, a taxonomy is finally proposed in terms of
the variables contained in their mathematical expres-
sions, the so-called scoring parameters (SPs), as these
are the only common trait shared across ESFs and
ALBC.
Fifth, the interrelationships among SPs in capped
and uncapped tenders need to be studied, in order to
understand why differences in subsequent bidding
behaviour are likely to be due to the implementation
of different combinations of SPs in the ESFs and
ALBC.
Finally, a brief note is given on how ESFs and
ALBC can be represented and that some of their fea-
tures are better understood graphically when expressed
as a function of one of their SPs.
Ranking versus scoring rules
When price is the sole criterion in awarding a contract,
there is no need to score the bids, since the auctioneer
is only interested in ordering or ranking the bids
received in terms of their value. There are many ranking
rules, including:
• Lowest price, which is the most common in con-
struction procurement (Palaneeswaran and
Kumaraswamy, 2000).
• Average bid method, in which the awarded bid is
the closest to the average bid of all the bid prices
for a project (Rocha de Gouveia, 2002).
• Below-average bid method, where the closest to
but less than the average bid wins the project
(Ioannou and Awwad, 2010).
• Truncated average bid or bid-spread method,
where the winning bid is defined as the closest to
the average computed after excluding outliers
(Waara and Bro¨chner, 2006).
However, a rank is not enough whenever bid prices
are combined with technical criteria, and an ESF is
needed to translate a bid price into a numerical score.
These latter mathematical expressions form the basis
of the taxonomy.
Capped versus uncapped tenders
In general, two dominant approaches concerning the
price boundaries are identified: capped and uncapped
tenders. In uncapped tenders, a bidder i submits an eco-
nomic bid (bi) which can range from 0 to +∞, unless
ALBC are implemented. Conversely, in capped tenders,
a bidder i submits a bid that is upper bounded (in price)
by the auctioneer and therefore has no option but to
equal or underbid this pre-set tender amount (A). Bids
can therefore range from 0 toA, unless ALBC are imple-
mented. Capped tenders also exhibit the property that
bids can be expressed in discounts or drops (di) off A,
i.e. a bidder i’s bid can be expressed as:
di ¼ 1$ bi
A
or bi ¼ 1$ dið ÞA (2)
Therefore, these discounts or drops can range from 0 to
1 in capped tenders. In addition, for clarification, the
pre-set maximum economic tender amount (A), is
sometimes called the ceiling price in the literature,
whereas the term reserve price is identified with ALBC
only if stated in the tender specifications (Chowdhury,
2008). Finally, as will be emphasized later, the most
important difference between capped and uncapped
tenders, beyond the way the bids are expressed, is that
their respective ‘scoring parameters’ (variables to be
introduced later that configure the ESF and ALBC
mathematical expressions) behave in different ways.
Existing tender practices
The main goal of the current study is to propose an
ESF and ALBC taxonomy, as both ESFs and ALBC
constitute the two major components of the economic
bid score (variables Si and δi). In order to achieve this,
a wide range of ESFs and ALBC in current practice
are needed to identify their common features. How-
ever, the economic and technical bid weightings that
are normally used with ESFs and ALBC (We and Wt
respectively) are also available for use in identifying
shared bidding behaviour trends across countries,
and from which the apparent or phony bid weighting
phenomenon was deduced as explained later in the
Discussion section.
Therefore, in the first instance, a thorough review of
tender specifications and national and international
public procurement methods was made. This review
consisted primarily of the compilation of ESFs and
ALBC implemented by contracting authorities or
supranational entities (EU and some multilateral agen-
cies) in various countries since, by registering those
mathematical criteria it was possible to find common
traits, especially among the scoring parameters.
Discipline-related books, several international agen-
cies commissioned reports as well as specific scientific
publications also provided very valuable information
and these were supplemented by real tendering data
provided by multiple international construction con-
tractors working in a wide range of countries.
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In terms of books and reports, Ballesteros-Pe´rez
and Skitmore (2014) provide a wide survey of ESFs
used in Spain. Waara and Bro¨chner (2006) and
Fuentes-Bargues et al. (2014) cover Swedish and Span-
ish ESFs respectively currently in use by contracting
authorities. Del Can˜o-Gochi et al. (2008) analyse and
compile the most common procurement approaches
and awarding criteria in France, the United States,
United Kingdom and Japan. Palaneeswaran and
Kumaraswamy (2000) describe a range of different
economic factors and systems still in use by public
agencies in the United States, Canada and Hong Kong.
The European Union (2002) sets a common frame-
work with examples of how each country has cus-
tomized ESFs and ALBC according to its needs.
Furthermore, multilateral agencies’ procurement
guidelines, such as those of the World Bank (2011),
United Nations (2006), EuropeAID (2014) and the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (2009) were reviewed.
Finally, we obtained a variety of examples of datasets
of tender specifications and results from several interna-
tional construction contractors in countries as diverse as
Mexico, Chile, Peru, Colombia, Argentina, Algiers,
Morocco, Oman, Egypt, Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria,
Australia, New Zealand and China. These tender speci-
fications and bidding results also served the secondary
purpose of the study, which was to determine the extent
to which particular ESF and ALBC configurations
forced bidders to behave in predictable ways.
ESF taxonomy proposal
The ESFs are mathematical expressions used to assign
numerical scores (Si) to each bidder i’s bid price. How-
ever, these mathematical expressions commonly make
use of other sub-variables for converting the price into
a score. These sub-variables or scoring parameters
(SPs) are usually calculated as a function of the final
distribution of bids (Ballesteros-Pe´rez, Gonza´lez-Cruz,
Pastor-Ferrando et al., 2012).
In uncapped tenders, the primary SPs are: the mini-
mum bid (bmin), which corresponds to the lowest bid;
the maximum bid (bmax), which corresponds to the
highest bid, the average bid (bm), which corresponds
to the average of all bids submitted, and, even though
it is uncommon to find it as a variable within an ESF,
the number of bidders (N) (Ballesteros-Pe´rez and
Skitmore, 2014). As an example, an ESF that gives
the maximum score (1) to the lowest bidder, i.e. S(1)
= 1, and the minimum score (generally 0) to the most
expensive bidder, i.e. S(N) = 0, would be written as:
Si ¼ bmax $ bi
bmax $ bmin
In capped tenders, the primary SPs are the same, but
expressed in discounts or drops, that is: the maximum
drop (dmax) corresponds to the lowest bid; the mini-
mum drop (dmin) corresponds to the highest bid; the
average drop (dm) corresponds to the average of all bids
(expressed in drops) submitted; and, again, the number
of bidders (N). The ESF example above can therefore
be equally expressed in drops whenever there is a
tender amount (A) as
Si ¼ di $ dmin
dmax $ dmin
Apart from the primary SPs, other frequently used
measures include the standard deviation of the bids/-
drops (s in uncapped tenders and σ in capped tenders)
(Ballesteros-Pe´rez, Gonza´lez-Cruz, Pastor-Ferrando
et al., 2012).
As a result, although ESFs may or may not use a
SP, in most cases they use at least one SP. Many ESFs
were identified in the aforementioned tender specifica-
tions and national and international public procure-
ment review. Classifying all these ESFs is similar to
classifying different kinds of equations found in mathe-
matics. Therefore, it was considered that the best way
to create the taxonomic review was to classify the ESFs
according to the SP they actually implemented. The
result is shown in Figure 1.
As can be seen, full, dotted and dashed lines repre-
sent many combinations of specific mathematical
expressions that ESFs may use to assign economic
scores to bids. As will also be noted later, the selection
of the SPs to be used by each ESF is not trivial and has
immediate repercussions on bidders’ competitiveness.
Scoring parameter (SP) relationships
To understand how an ESF may produce effects on
competitive behaviour, it is necessary to first
understand how the SPs actually behave and how they
are interconnected. In doing this, several studies
have recently made significant advances. Of these,
Ballesteros-Pe´rez, Gonza´lez-Cruz, and Can˜avate-
Grimal (2012) first proposed a set of equations (speci-
fied later in Table 2) that relate each SP to each other
in capped tenders with average curve shapes depicted
at the bottom in Figure 2 as a function of the SP
mean drop dm. These curved trajectories seem quite
logical, taking into account the two boundary price
conditions of capped tenders (represented with symbol
in the graph). These types of tenders are upper-
limited by A and below by 0, so that, if expressed in
drops, bids are 0 ≤ di ≤ 1. These particular boundaries
force the SP to coincide at points 0; 0ð Þ and 1; 1ð Þ,
with the exception of σ at 1; 0ð Þ.
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By understanding the capped SP relationships, it is
easy to obtain the uncapped SP relationships too by
means of the graph at the top. This is of course a sim-
pler case with only one boundary condition, which is
shared with the graph as represented by symbol .
Therefore the SP in uncapped tenders should follow
the linear relationships depicted at the top of Figure 2.
These relationships are not deterministic since SPs
have statistical variation around their average curves.
However, despite seeming logical, the uncapped SP
relationships inferred require a demonstration. In order
to do so, Ballesteros-Pe´rez’s (2010) actual uncapped
construction tender database is used. This dataset com-
prises 45 tenders of design, build and operation of
waste water treatment plants and sewage systems con-
tracts from northern Spain awarded between 2007
and 2008. The dataset includes all bidders’ bids from
which calculating the SPs mean bid (bm), minimum
bid (bmin), maximum bid (bmax) and the standard devia-
tion of bids (s) is straightforward. The dataset also
includes one bidder’s cost estimates (bo) for 14 tenders.
The most representative results of the SP curve
calculations can be seen in Figure 3 and Table 1 along
with the coefficients of determination (R2). R2 values
close to 1 confirm that the SPs’ relationships deduced
from the capped tender case point in the right direction.
Furthermore, it is emphasized that the curves
depicted in Figures 2 and 3 are expressed as a func-
tion of some regression parameters: named a, b and
c in uncapped tenders, and α, β and γ in capped
tenders. Therefore, by analysing the variation of these
regression parameters over time, it is possible to study
how aggressively or conservatively the bidders bid in a
particular context: with the same ESF and ALBC for
instance, or even according to a country’s particular
economic situation.
Additional details of how these regression parame-
ters are calculated when a number of n tenders is
analysed for capped tenders can be found in Balles-
teros-Pe´rez and Skitmore (2014) and summarized for
the first time for both capped and uncapped tenders
in Table 2.
This Table, despite representing a collective model
(i.e., not taking into account the bidders’ identities), pro-
vides an important step towards understanding both the
ESF and the way bidders behave in a particular tender.
ESF graphical representation
In order to finish describing the most representative
features of an ESF it is worth mentioning that ESFs
can be represented in several different ways. The first,
which could be called the classic way, consists of repre-
senting the ESF variation in a graph with axes
expressed in bids bi or drops di (X-axis) and score Si
(Y-axis). This is the kind of representation chosen for
the 16 graphs shown in Figure 1.
Another recent approach to represent an ESF is by
iso-Score Curve Graphs (iSCG) (Ballesteros-Pe´rez,
Gonza´lez-Cruz, Pastor-Ferrando et al., 2012) in which
the X-axis usually represents one of the SPs, the Y-axis
represents any bidder’s bid or drop (bi or di), while the
curves represent the combination of X ; Yð Þ points in
which the ESF provides the same level of score to a
bidder’s bid or drop.
These iSCG have the advantage of showing the
whole picture of how any ESF reacts as a function of
both the SPs themselves and as a function of the bid-
ders’ past encounters, which suggests applications in
competitive bidding issues again and a new way to
interpret ESF effects on bidding behaviour.
Uncapped tenders
Capped tenders
bmax = f(bm)
dmax = f(dm)
dmin = f(dm)
= f(dmin,dmax,N)
do = f(dm)
dm
bmin = f(bm)
S = f(bmin, bmax, N)
bo = f(bm)
bm
dm(/1)
di(/1)
dm(/1)
bi ($)
bm ($)
+∞
+∞
0
0
1
0
0
45º
1
σ
Figure 2 Major scoring parameter (SP) relationships in
capped and uncapped tenders
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Abnormally low bids criteria (ALBC)
taxonomy
In parallel with reviewing the prominent features of the
ESF and its parameters, the ALBC expressions were
also analysed. ALBC have the task of setting a cut-off
bid (babn) or drop (dabn) that disqualifies any bidder
whose bid is cheaper (unless the bidder is capable of
justifying this price (European Union, 2004)).
There are several existing systems in use by many
countries that are intended to detect abnormally low
bids. The most recurring example essentially consists
of arithmetic systems that measure the deviation of a
particular bid from the average of all bids submitted,
with minor differences in the percentage and/or calcula-
tion of the average (for instance Belgium, France, Italy,
Portugal, Spain and Greece use ranges mostly varying
between 10% and 15%) (European Union, 1999).
However, as the EU Commission reports (European
Union, 1999), there is to date no systematic method
that enables the effective evaluation of ALBC in EMAT
or BV auctions, since the systems currently in use are
recognized to be of limited efficacy.
Of the tender specifications analysed, six generic
ALBC were identified. Some are applicable to capped
tenders only and others apply to both capped and
uncapped tenders. Basically, there are two groups of
ALBC: those that make use of a SP (only cases of bm/
dm, s/σ and N have been found), and those that do
not make use of any SP and, therefore, the cut-off limit
does not depend on the final bid distribution. In these
ALBC, the cut-off economic limit can be known in
advance, that is, before the tender deadline. This also
happens with the ESF: whenever no SP is used (case
6 in Figure 1), the ESF is totally predictable and
unmovable, no matter what final bids are submitted.
The six ALBC, the first four of which are expressed
as a function of one SP and the last two as a function of
no SP whatsoever, are then:
babn ¼ 1$ eð Þ bm Possible in both capped and
uncapped tenders. Basically, it is
the most common criterion in EU
countries, with a parameter ɛ that
is usually set between 0.05 and
0.20. Any bid that fulfils the
condition bi < babn will be ruled
out as inadmissible
dabn ¼ 1þ hð Þ dm Possible in capped tenders only.
This uses a multiple of the
average drop such that all bidders
with a higher drop (di > dabn) will
be not considered. Parameter θ
also usually ranges between 0.05
0
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and 0.20. Perhaps, as found many
times in the literature, it is
interesting to point out that,
whenever the expression of dabn
comes from the translation of the
previous ALBC as a function of ɛ,
then dabn ¼ 1$ 1þ eð Þ 1$ dmð Þ
babn ¼ bm $ k s Possible in both uncapped (under
the expression on the left) and
uncapped tenders (under the
translated expression
dabn ¼ dm þ k r). It sets a threshold
in bid or drop standard deviation
multiples, beyond which all
bidders are disqualified.
Parameter k usually ranges
between 0.5 and 2
Nabn ¼ 1$ lð Þ N2 Possible for capped and uncapped
tenders. Basically, this criterion
directly eliminates a proportion μ
of bidders just for being located at
the extremes (in one or in both
extremes lowest and highest). μ
usually ranges between 0.05 and
0.25. Finally, there is another
variation of this criterion by which
a pre-set number of bidders
(Nabn = η) is disqualified (no
matter how many bidders are
actually competing)
babn = ω Useful for capped and uncapped
tenders. This makes no use of SP
so it is a deterministic cut-off limit
for a particular economic amount
the auctioneer considers too low
to be acceptable. As happens with
the rest of ALBC expressions, this
limit has to be included in the
tender specifications, otherwise it
does not comply with the
principles of transparency,
publicity and equality of
opportunity. Parameter ω is
generally chosen depending on the
particular tender economic
volume and/or the engineer’s
estimate
dabn = δ Similar to the previous ALBC, but
only applicable for capped
tenders. This sets a drop value
above which any bidder’s drop will
be disqualified. Parameter δ is
generally set within the range 0.10
to 0.30
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All these ALBC are interconnected, that is, it is
possible to find a mathematical equivalency between
the proportion of bidders disqualified in the first four
ALBC (the ones that use a SP) and between the last
two ALBC (the ones that make no use of any SP). This
equivalency has been proposed in the Appendix by
means of Tables A1 and A2, respectively. However
those calculations require knowing the exact bid proba-
bility distribution function, which has been an unsolved
and ongoing research bidding topic over the years. In
this connection Skitmore (2013) reports some of the
most common found in the scientific literature, such
as uniform, normal, lognormal, gamma and Weibull.
For a first approach, however, Tables A1 and A2
assume a simple uniform distribution.
A last relevant practical note concerning ALBC
found during the tender review was that, when compet-
ing with ALBC mathematical expressions that make no
use of SPs (expressions babn = ω and dabn = δ), most
bids tend to be close to the cut-off limit (ω or δ), appar-
ently sacrificing bigger profits.
Mathematically this can be simply explained for
uncapped tenders as, when bm → ω, therefore, bmin
→ ω (otherwise the lowest bidder is directly disquali-
fied) and the maximum bid has no option but bmax →
ω. Then, since bmax – bmin → 0, so does the standard
deviation s → 0. Analogously, Nabn → 0 (because
everyone knows where the cut-off limit is located),
therefore, bm is stuck near ω making it impossible to
establish a statistical relationship with the rest of ALBC
which make use of SPs (first four shown in this
section).
In capped tenders, a similar reasoning process may
arise: dm→ δ and so do dmax→ δ and dmin→ δ, forcing
σ → 0, whereas Nabn → 0 as well.
This situation has immediate practical repercus-
sions since it constitutes the first empirical proof that
when bidders can accurately calculate the risk of being
disqualified (because they know in advance where
exactly ω or δ are), most will place their bids just before
crossing that extreme. In this way, bidders avoid losing
as much economic score as possible, despite frequently
relinquishing more profits compared to situations in
which the ALBC depend on a SP and the final position
of the cut-off limit is not known in advance.
Discussion
In addition to the review of tender specifications, litera-
ture and public procurement methods allowing the
ESF and ALBC taxonomies to be created, several other
interesting issues on bidding behaviour have emerged.
For example, how SPs relate to each other (summa-
rized in Table 2), how bid distribution concentrates
near the cut-off limit when the ALBC make no use of
SP, and how the ALBC are mathematically intercon-
nected (shown in the Appendix). Another recurrent
effect of apparent or phony economic bid weighting takes
place whenever a percentage of the economic score
(Si ) is either never achievable or always awarded.
To introduce this phenomenon, suppose the eco-
nomic and technical bid weightings in a tender are bal-
anced (We = Wt = 0.5) and that the tender
specifications adopt an ESF that gives away 0.30 (out
of the total 1.00) no matter the bid or drop the bidder
is submitting. An example of this ESF would be:
Si ¼ 0:30þ 0:70 bmax $ bi
bmax $ bmin or
Si ¼ 0:30þ 0:70 di $ dmin
dmax $ dmin
In this case, bidders can only compete to achieve an eco-
nomic score from 0.30 to 1.00. In other terms, the fol-
lowing fraction of the overall score, Oi, 0.30 ⋅
We = 0.30 ⋅ 0.5 = 0.15 is not disputed. If this happens,
the true economic bid weighting (W 'e ) is not now 0.5, but
We 1$ 0:30ð Þ out of the overall possible score
We 1$ 0:30ð Þ þWt; that is, We 1$0:30ð ÞWe 1$0:30ð ÞþWt ¼
0:5 1$0:30ð Þ
0:5 1$0:30ð Þþ0:5 ¼¼ 0:350:35þ0:5 ( 0:412, which forces the true
technical bid weighting (W 't ) to be
1$W 'e ( 1$ 0:412 ¼ 0:588, instead of 0.5. This is a
significant deviation from the situation in which the
weightings were intended to be balanced.
This phenomenon can be generalized, even for the
technical bid weighting, and takes place not only when-
ever a fraction of the economic score (Q) is given away
by the ESF, but also when a fraction of the score is
unreachable mathematically or at least unreachable
(undisputed) in normal conditions of competitiveness.
In these cases, the general expression for calculating
the true economic bid weighting is:
W 'e ¼
We 1$Qð Þ
Wt þWe 1$Qð Þ (3)
If Wt = 1 − We then,
W 'e ¼
We 1$Qð Þ
1$Weð Þ þWe 1$Qð Þ ¼
1$Qð ÞWe
1$QWe (4)
where:
We: is the original economic bid weighting (in per-
unit values) stated in the tender specifications.
W 'e : is the true economic bid weighting (in per-unit
values) with W 'e )We always.
Q: is the fraction of the economic score either rarely
or almost always achievable (in per-unit values).
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Wt: is the original technical bidweighting (in per-unit
values) stated in the tender specifications.
W 't : is the true technical bid weighting (in per-unit
values) with W 't ¼ 1$W 'e .
A representation of Equation 4 can be found in
Figure 4 for all the intervening variables.
Using the diagram above is quite simple. Generally,
the user must enter by the lower X-axis through analys-
ing the ESF and estimating Q, then select the curve We
corresponding to the value stated in the tender speci-
fications and find the position of the vertical intersection
with which to obtain the true economic (W 'e ) and
technical (W 't ¼ 1$W 'e ) bid weighting values on the
left and right, respectively.
Practical implications of both Equation 4 and
Figure 4 are evident. If tender specifications implement
ESFs with mathematical expressions that do not allow
awarding the whole range of economic scores (from 0
to 1) to the competing bidders, the economic and
technical bid weightings will become increasingly
reversed (We will lose actual weight in favour of the
technical bid weighting Wt) as the fraction of
undisputed economic score increases. This situation
could mislead bidders’ strategies, or even be used (in-
tentionally or unintentionally) by the contracting
authorities to give the appearance of applying some
economic and technical bid weightings while actually
applying different ones.
However, perhaps, the most difficult issue is to
estimate Q, since not all ESFs are as simple as the
one provided in the example. For this purpose, the
bidders or contracting authorities can make use of the
SP estimated cost bid (bo) or drop (do) from a future
tender for forecasting the rest of SP (by means of
Table 2) and, with these values, calculate the final
ESF curve, with which observing Q is trivial.
In general, any owner or auctioneer, when design-
ing and implementing a new ESF for future tender
specifications should bear in mind that the ‘whole
range’ of possible scores (from 0.00 to 1.00) must
always be actually achievable by the bidders in normal
conditions of competitiveness. Nonetheless, strictly
speaking, this can only be possible by implementing
an ESF under cases 4 or 5 of the ESF taxonomy in
Figure 1, since they are the only ones that award the
maximum score (Smax = 1) to the lowest bidder (that
is, to SP bmin or dmax) and the minimum score
(Smin = 0) to the highest bidder (that is, to bmax or
dmin). From this last statement, it is clear that specific
ESFs that make no use of any SP (case 6 in Figure 1)
are the most vulnerable to apparent economic bid
weighting.
However, the problem with cases 4 and 5 is that
these ESFs are the most vulnerable to collusion,
particularly cover-bidding, in which bidding rings
can greatly condition the final economic scores (by
submitting extremely high and/or low bids for pushing
the rest of the bidders’ scores towards the average,
thus also paradoxically diminishing the economic bid
weighting).
In this sense, all the combinations of SPs from
Figure 1 would actually require ALBC to be imple-
mented for both the high and lower extremes of the
bid distribution with the simultaneous aim of avoiding
1.0
0.9 Curves representWe values
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.00.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
W
t
W
e
Q
Figure 4 Apparent economic bid weighting variation
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bid-covering. The key is how to set the right ALBC
width: narrow enough to make collusion difficult, but
not so narrow so as to reject bids that are actually com-
petitive and truthful. Obviously, the problem of reach-
ing the perfect configuration and combination of ESF
and ALBC still requires further research, but has now
acquired a new dimension by highlighting how appar-
ent or phony bid weighting is also an important effect
to be considered in seeking a solution.
Conclusions
Whenever there is need for converting price bids into
scores for combination with technical proposal attri-
butes, such as quality or client’s preferences (likeMEAT
and BV), mathematical criteria need to be included in
the tender specifications. The classification of these
mathematical criteria, named economic scoring formu-
las (ESFs) and abnormally low bids criteria (ALBC),
constituted the main aim of the present study.
By going through their taxonomies it is clear that
there are many ESFs and ALBC currently in use for
evaluating price bid proposals in construction auctions
and they affect bidding behaviour in profound ways,
most of which are little understood. As a result, their
design in practice is invariably a highly intuitive process,
involving few theoretical or empirical considerations.
In this paper, several outcomes relating to ESFs and
ALBC have been considered and analysed. After a wide
but thorough review of international tender specifica-
tions along with multiple other sources such as interna-
tional public procurement guidelines and scientific
articles and books on the topic, new ESF and ALBC
taxonomies have been proposed. These taxonomies will
enable expanding research in the near future while estab-
lishing a reasonable degree of homogeneity concerning
nomenclature and denominations.
Furthermore, because of classifying the ESF and
ALBC according to their scoring parameters (SPs)
actually used, their relationships have now been
adduced for uncapped tenders (tenders without an
upper-price limitation). This will be useful for analys-
ing changes or habits in bidding behaviour in upcoming
research since they can accurately depict recurring
statistical information on tenders.
Additionally, several other results derived from the
ESF and ALBC taxonomies have been obtained. For
example, it has been explained how bid distribution
concentrates near the cut-off limit when the ALBC
makes no use of a SP, as well as how ALBC are actually
mathematically interrelated whenever a SP is used.
Finally, apparent or phony economic bid weighting
explains how the economic bid weighting is actually
overestimated whenever an ESF does not assign the
whole range of scores to all the participating bidders.
This phenomenon is quite common in ESF in real
practice and has to be avoided when designing both
ESFs and ALBC.
From the several examples provided in the paper, it
is clear that previous research on auction design is still
very far from incorporating important practical issues,
some of which have been described here. The main con-
tribution here is a compilation and perhaps a first step
towards a new approach in bidding analysis useful to
both auctioneers and bidders. This is especially the case
with the former when designing or selecting a particular
combination of ESF and ALBC for the tender specifica-
tions. However, the present analysis is mostly restricted
to providing a general qualitative picture. The next logi-
cal research step will be the development of a quantita-
tive means for determining, and hence controlling, the
effect of small variations in the ESF and/or ALBC
mathematical expressions on, for instance, the level of
bidders’ aggressiveness/conservativeness in a future ten-
der. Taken together with the risk attitudes of the indi-
viduals involved, a new door is opened for the
possibility of personalized optimal price scoring rules
in construction auction design.
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Note
1. To avoid confusion, the terms ‘auction’ and ‘tender’ will
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‘client’, ‘owner’ and ‘contracting authority’. Strictly
speaking, the words ‘construction auctions’ in this study
do not refer to ‘classical auctions’ where the highest
bidder often wins, but actually refer to ‘procurement
auctions’ or ‘reverse auctions’, which are a common type
of auction in which the roles of the buyer (client, owner,
auctioneer or contracting authority) and the seller
(bidders or tenderers) are reversed with the primary
objective to drive purchase prices downward.
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Appendix
The following tables allow the conversion of one criterion of
the ALBC to another assuming the bid distribution follows
a uniform distribution, which constitutes a simplification of
the reality. Depending on which is the known ALBC expres-
sion, locate that column and go down until reaching the same
row where the text ‘independent variable’ can be read. The
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rest of the ALBC expressions into which the initial known
ALBC expression can be translated will remain in the same
row in adjacent cells.
For the interested reader, mathematical proofs (❶–⓮) of
Tables A1 and A2 can be found as Supplemental online
material.
Table A1 Mathematical relationships among abnormally low bids criteria (ALBC) with scoring parameters (SPs)
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Table A2 Mathematical relationships among abnormally low bids criteria (ALBC) without scoring parameters (SPs)
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